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EMPLOYER SPEECH AND RELATED ISSUES
DONALD H. WOLLET* AND JAMES RowENO*
An employer violates section 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act if he interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by section 7, including the right
to form, join, or assist labor organizations. Any employer unfair labor
practice under section 8(a) of the NLRA also is a violation of section
8(a) (1),' but some types of employer conduct violate section 8(a) (1)
only, constituting "independent" 8 (a) (1) violations. Our inquiry in this
paper is limited to the regulation of employer speech, interrogation,
espionage and surveillance as "independent" 8(a) (1) violations.
Our primary effort will be to identify changes during the past
twenty years in the Board's application of section 8(a)(1) to these
forms of employer conduct. Where the timing of a change was prox-
imate to a change in Board personnel or a shift in the political climate,
we shall try to determine whether the latter event was a substantial
causal factor in producing the change.
Although the NLRB at times has prescribed definite, easy-to-apply
rules for some issues arising under section 8 (a) (1) (the present "captive
audience" rule, for example), the question whether an employer's con-
duct interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees is usually one of
fact. The ultimate question in most cases is whether the conduct tended
to -produce a coercive effect. Direct proof of this effect is not necessary.
A tendency to coerce, inferred by the Board from proved employer
conduct, is enough.2
So many factual circumstances are pertinent in determining whether
conduct or speech tends to coerce, and there are so many cases, that
a mere comparison of a few such cases does not necessarily convey an
accurate impression of the trend of the law. Reading all the cases as
they have been reported over the past twenty years, one may gain an
impression of certain shifts of emphasis in the decisions on what tends
to coerce, but for the most part this impression is difficult to relate to
specific cases. The problem is like that of tracing the trend in judicial
opinions on what constitutes reasonable care in negligence cases. All that
one can reasonably hope to do is -to note the development and modifi-
cation of criteria that the Board has applied in making its determinations.
Vhere the Board's stated criteria have remained constant, it may never-
theless have varied the weight that it has given different facts in applying
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Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954). See N.L.R.B. v. Universal Camera Co., 340
U.S. 474 (19S).
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those criteria to different situations. We have not, however, attempted to
analyze the cases in these terms.
Even where one is able to trace definite changes in the Board's
decisions, it is usually difficult to determine the reasons for those changes.
The adoption by the Board of new rules or the modification of old ones
may follow chronologically certain extrinsic events, such as a change in
Board personnel, without the relationship being a causal one. The Board
may sometimes change its position in response either to decisions of the
reviewing courts or to a change in statutory language, or the modification
of an old rule may merely reflect the inevitable growth of doctrine when
it is applied to new facts. Finally, a change may result solely from the
fact that as men acquire the wisdom of experience they sometimes change
their minds, quite apart from any extrinsic event.
I. PERSUASION BY SPEECH
A. What an Employer May Say
The principle of section 8(a)(1) is that employers should not
coerce, restrain, or interfere with their employees in the exercise of the;r
right to join a union or engage in other protected activities.3 On the other
hand, the principle of the First Amendment is that freedom of expres-
sion and the communication of ideas should not be restricted. The appli-
cation of these two principles to employer anti-union speech results in
a conflict that has been the source of many litigated cases. As the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has indicated:
. . . any address or other communication from an employer
made directly to his employees may have, and ordinarily will
have, a double aspect: on the one hand, it is an expression of
his own beliefs and an attempt to persuade his employees to
accept them; on the other, it is an indication of his feelings
which his hearers may believe will take a form inimicable to
to those of them whom he does not succeed in convincing.
In order to find a section 8(a) (1) violation, the employer's speech
must "interfere with, restrain, or coerce." Accordingly, the Board has
never, and could never, base an unfair labor practice finding on employer
speech without first determining that the speech interfered with, restrained,
or coerced employees in the exercise of their rights protected by section 7.
Conversely, the Board has always held that speech violated the Act where
it tended to coerce employees, as by threatening reprisal against those
who join unions, or promising benefits to those who do not.
In the early years of the Wagner Act free speech was seldom a
principal issue. The Board was concerned primarily with cases where
the employer had, by present standards, flagrantly violated the law and
3 Since most section 8(a) (1) cases involve interference with union organiza-
tion, we shall discuss section 8(a) (1) violations principally with reference to that
type of interference. Of course, the right to join a union and to organize is only
one of the rights protected by section 7.
4 NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. 2d 993, 994. (2d Cir. 1943).
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committed numerous unfair labor practices. Where employer speech
formed a basis for an unfair labor -practice charge it usually either con-
tained threats of reprisal against those who joined unions or promises
of benefit to those who did not or was surrounded by numerous other
serious unfair labor practices. Nevertheless, the Board from its inception
regarded employer anti-union speech with disapproval, and often cited
such speech as an additional fact of interference. Thus the first annual
report of the NLRB states: "[A] part from -discrimination against union
members, the most common form of interference with self organization
engaged in by employers is to spread propaganda against unions and thus
not only poison the minds of workers against them but also indicate that
the employers are antagonistic to unions and are prepared to make this
antagonism effective." 4a
When the issue was eventually presented to the Board squarely it
tended to favor the principle of preventing any possible intimidation
over the principle of encouraging freedom of expression. The Board em-
phasized that strong employer expressions of anti-union sentiment tend to
cause employees to fear for their job security if they join a union. The
Board sometimes seemed to say that strong employer expressions of anti-
union sentiment are themselves coercive, or even that an employer must
remain completely neutral in the matter of union organization.5
In 1941 in the Virginia Electric case' the Supreme Court held
that the employer anti-union speech is constitutionally protected where
it is not coercive; the Court stated that the Wagner Act merely outlaws
statements that are coercive. But in remanding the Virginia Electric case
to the Board for further findings, the Court held that in determining
whether speech is coercive the Board should examine the speech in the
totality of the employer's conduct, and that even if the speech does not
itself contain any threats or promises it may be considered coercive if it
is surrounded 'by discriminatory discharges or other acts of hostility
towards unions or interference with union organization. After the
Virginia Electric decision the Board abandoned the intimations in its
earlier opinions that an employer must maintain strict neutrality on the
matter of union organization and adhered at least in principle to the
criteria stated by the Supreme Court. However in the period immediately
following the Virginia Electric decision the Board appeared to find that
speech was coercive on the basis of the totality of the employer's conduct
wherever the employer had engaged in some prohibited anti-union con-
duct.7
4a I N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 73 (19-6).
5 See Ford Motor Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 377, 379 (1939); Sunbeam Electric
Manufacturing Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 469, 1485 (1942); American Tube Bending Co.,
44 N.L.R.B. 121, 129 (1942).
6NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
Compare Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
7 See the cases cited in footnote 8, infra.
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The Board continued to adhere in principle to the criteria stated in
the Virginia Electri decision through to the Taft-Hartley amendments,
but by 1946 and 1947 it was no longer so strict in applying the criteria
to specific cases.
There are several reasons that might be advanced for the Board's
changed attitude. It might have been caused by the more critical public
view of unions and collective bargaining that was generated by some
dramatic war and post war work-stoppages. The Board might also have
been influenced to give greater lattitude to employer speech because
the greatly increased strength of unions seemed to lessen the potential
intimidating effect of anti-union speech. In ascribing reasons for the
Board's changed attitude, it is also perhaps significant that there was a
constant turnover of Board personnel. By August 1941 all of the original
members of the Madden Board of the 1930's had been replaced; by
August 1946 only Houston remained as a survivor of the Millis Board
of the early 1940's, Herzog having become chairman a year earlier;
although it is difficult to generalize about personalities, it is arguable
that some of the later appointees were not as imbued with a fervor in
support of unionization as some of the earlier ones. These comments
are, of course, highly speculative. The fact is that irrespective of any of
the above circumstances, the Board's changed attitude can be easily
and fully explained by the numerous decisions of the courts of appeal
that held that the Board had previously gone too far in basing a finding
that speech was coercive on the totality of the employer's conduct.'
In any event, by 1947 the Board was conforming to the decisions
of the courts of appeal. It continued to consider coercive per se statements
that contained an actual, implied, or veiled promise of benefit or threat
of reprisal, and it continued to hold that otherwise privileged statements
acquired a coercive character when they were an integral part of a
course of anti-union conduct which in its totality was coercive.' But the
Board did not find a coercive totality of conduct to exist where anti-
8 NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. 2d 905, 913-915 (6th Cir. 1940), modi-
fying and enforcing 14 N.L.1.B. 346, NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co.,
134 F. 2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943), denying enforcement of 44 N.L.R.B. 121.
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1944); Diamond
T. Motors Co. v. NLRB, 119 F. 2d 978 (7th Cir. 1941). NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis
& Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944), denying enforcement of 54 N.L.R.B. 880.
NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F. 2d 198, modifying and enforcing, 57
N.L.R.B. 89.
For a thorough discussion of free speech under the Wagner Act, See Morgan,
Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Jct, 20 TuL. L. RaV. 469 (1946).
9 10 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 37 (1945); 11 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 34 (1946). See
Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945). Kalamazoo Stationery Co.,
66 N.L.R.B. 930, 949-51 (1946). Kopman-Worachek Shoe Mfg. Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
789 (1946). American Laundry Machine Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 25 (1944).
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union statements which contained no threats or promises were separated
from other acts of hostility against union members."
Taft-Hartley Law
Although the legislative history of the free speech amendment of
the Taft-Hartley law is confusing in terms of its meaning," Congress
plainly felt that the Board had gone too far in basing unfair labor prac-
tice charges on employer speech. The majority House Report on H.R.
3020 stated: "Although the Labor Board says it does not limit free
speech, its decisions show that it uses against people what the Constitution
says they can say freely." ' 1 Also see the Senate Report on S.R. 1126
where the committee stated that the Board had placed a limited con-
struction on the Supreme Court decisions by holding speeches by employers
to be coercive if the employer was found guilty of some other unfair
labor practice, even though severable or unrelated."lb
The Taft-Hartley law relettered former subsection 8(1) as
8(a) (1), but did not change the language of that subsection. However,
Congress added the "free speech" section, 8(c), which provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of the act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
Speaking of section 8(c) shortly after its enactment, the NLRB stated:
"This section appears to enlarge somewhat the protection previously
accorded by the original statute and to grant immunity beyond that con-
templated by the free speech guarantees of the Constitution." ' As
a consequence of section 8(c) there was a noticeable shift in the Board
decisions on several points:
a. The Board did not admit an employer's noncoercive statements
to show his anti-union motive in cases where motive was in issue. 12
b. The Board did not consider coercive an employer's statements
which in their context did not contain a threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit, irrespective of other acts of hostility towards a union.13
10 Fisher Governor Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1921, 1924 (1946). Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 72 N.LR.B. 132, 134 (1947); La Salle Steel Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 411, 413
(1947).
11 See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1947).
llaH. R. REP. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947).
l1b S. REP. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23-24 (1947).
11C 13 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 49 (1948).
12 Compare, Fisher Governor Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1946), enforced in 163
F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1947), with Consumers Cooperative Refinery Association, 77
N.L.R.B. 528, 530 (1948), enforced in 180 F. 2d 581 (5th Cir. 1950). See also The
Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948) ; 13 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 49-50 (1948).
1'Bailey Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 941, 942 (1948); D. D. Bean & Sons Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 724 (1948); D. H. Holmes Ltd., 81 N.L.R.B. 753 (1949); In view of the
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c. The Board did not necessarily consider employer speech coercive
by reason of the fact that it contained broad untrue charges against, or
ridiculed or villified, a union, its officers, or its members, or used
intemperate language.
1 4
Since the enactment of section 8(c) a principle source of
controversy has been whether particular instances of speech contain
threats of repisal or promises of benefit. The first question in these
cases is what the employer said; the second question is whether
the statement amounted to a threat or promise. An employer plainly
commits an unfair practice where he makes a promise of benefit or threat
of repraisal which is expressly conditioned on whether a union wins an
election or whether the employees engage in some other form of pro-
tected activityY For example, an employer's threat that he will shut down
a plant, or reduce employment, or reduce wages if a union prevails in an
election was an unfair labor practice under the Wagner Act, was an
unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act prior to the recent
changes in the national administration and in Board personnel, and is still
an unfair labor practice.' 8
The line becomes a difficult one to draw where the employer at-
tempts to convince his employees that dire results will follow if the plant
is unionized, but bases his arguments on alleged inevitable consequences
of unionization, rather than on any threat on his part to punish the em-
ployees for joining a union. Thus the employer may state that it would be
impossible for him to meet union wages, and that therefore he would
have to lay off men or close the shop. Or the employer may state that
a union would be so disruptive or would so act to retard hard work that
he could not operate as efficiently and therefore could not raise wages.
The employer's position in these cases is that he is not making any
threats, 'but is merely stating his opinion of the consequences that will
come from unionization. Even if one concedes that unionization seldom
leads to the dire consequences that some employers predict, nevertheless,
such consequences occur in enough cases so that one can not say that
every employer who makes these arguments is acting in bad faith. If it
decision of the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F. 2d 822 (1949),
it is arguable, however that section 8(c) did not completely abrogate the totality
of conduct doctrine.
14 Atlantic Stages, 78 N.L.R.B. 553 (1948) ; Globe Wireless, Ltd., 88 N.L.R.B.
1252 (1950); Grand Central Aircraft Co., Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1953). 14
N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 54-55 (1949). Compare R. R. Donnelly & Sons, 60 N.L.R.B.
635 (1945), decided under the Wagner Act.
15 For a detailed listing of some of the types of promises and threats which
are not protected, see 16 N.LR.B. Ann. Rep. 1414 (1951); Daykin, The Employer's
Right of Free Speech Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 IOWA L. Riy. 212, 223-8
(1952).
16 See Barby's Frosted Foods, 108 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1954); Richards and
Associates, 110 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1954); Mills-Morris Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 169
(1954); Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1954).
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is at least possible that such consequences will follow, then the policy
favoring free discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of unioniza-
tion applies to employer predictions of such consequences. On the other
hand, in most cases a prediction by an employer that unionization will lead
to lower wages, lay offs, and shut downs, though couched as an opinion,
will have the same effect as a threat. The intelligent employer certainly
may word a statement so carefully and persuasively that it will be only
an effective statement of the employer's opinion, yet its effect may be the
same as a threat.'
7
Although the board at one time tended to treat as an implied threat
any prophecy that unionization would lead to loss of employment,'
8
since 1947, immediately before and ever since the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments, the Board has held that such prophecies are protected where the
employer does not threaten to use his economic power to make the
prophecy come true. 9
In recent years the number of cases has increased where the Board
has sustained employer speech which prophesied loss of employment or
shut-down in the event of unionization.2" Although one commentator 2
has ascribed this numerical increase to shifts in Board personnel and greater
leniency towards employer speech, the increased number of cases may be
attributable solely to the fact that employers have learned to bring their
statements within rules previously accepted by the Board.
Of course, it does not follow from the fact that the Board is applying
the same principles today as it did prior to 1952 that there has 'been no
shift in Board attitudes. As we said at the outset, the question whether a
statement contains a threat or promise is essentially a factual one, and one
17 The mere fact that a statement is in form a prophecy of course does not
bring it within the free speech protection where under all the circumstances it
may reasonably be interpreted as a threat. See J. S. Abercrombie, 83 N.L.R.B. 524
(1949) ; New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953).
18 See A. J. Showalter, 64 N.LR.B. 573 (1945) (opinion that unionization
might cause principal customer to withdraw his business).
19Electric Steel Foundry, 74 N.LR.B. 129 (1947); Hagy, Harrington &
Marsh, 74 N.L..B. 1455 (1947); Mylan-Sparta Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1948);
Cleveland Plastics, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 513 (1949); Silver Knit Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
99 N.L.R.B. 422 (1952).
20Morgantown Full Fashioned Hosiery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1534 (1954);
Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 377 (1953) ; Gillcraft Furniture Co., 103
N.L.R.B. 81 (1953). .4lso see National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300
(1953) and Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953).
21 Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein of "Employer
Persuasion," Professor Wirtz cites in support of his view the statement in Chicopee
Manufacturing Corp., supra, footnote 20, that "[A] prophecy that unionization might
ultimately lead to loss of employment is not coercive where there is no threat that
the employer will use its economic power to make its prophecy come true." Yet
this is almost the exact language of the Board in the Mylan-Sparta case, supra,
footnote 19, decided in 1948. Moreover, two of the four members deciding the
Chicopee case were not Eisenhower appointees.
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trier of fact may weigh evidence differently than another. Although the
Board now appears to apply the same criteria as formerly, it is arguable
that it is less inclined than formerly to find that a statement is or tends to
coerce. We have not attempted to analyze the cases in these terms.
B. Where, when and how the employer may speak
Since the effect of an employer's conduct is a "subtle thing" requir-
ing "a high degree of introspective perception," 22 the trier of fact must
not only appraise the content of the speech but must also weigh the
circumstances surrounding it, including the place and time at which it is
delivered.
The question whether restraint should be placed on employer speech
at certain times and places raises policy issues similar to those presented
where the question is whether peaceful picketing should be restrained.
The words spoken on a picket line, even though innocuous on their
face, lose "significance as an appeal to reason" and become "part of
an instrument of force" where they are set in a context of coercion;
23
and they are not immune from regulation where they are an integral
part of conduct otherwise unlawful.2 4 Similarly, in the employer speech
cases the effect of language is judged in its context and against the "totality
of conduct."
Quite apart from what is said, a picket line as a means of com-
munication "involves patrol of a particular locality" and "may induce
action of one kind or another irrespective of the . . . ideas . . . dis-
seminated." 25 For this reason, it has been held that a court may restrain
the communication of information by a picket line in circumstances where
dissemination of the same information by some other mode of com-
munication, e.g., a newspaper, might be privileged under the First
Amendment.2" It is method, not content, that is the subject of regulation.
The same kind of analysis may be applied to employer speech on company
property and time.
The 20-year history of the NLRB reveals a very unsteady ap-
proach to the question of the extent to which employer anti-union speech
is permissible when uttered under these circumstances. In decisions as early
as 1937 and 1938 the Board held that employer speeches delivered on
company property violated section 8(a) (1). However, the rationale of
these decisions was that the speech was coercive either because it contained
threats, was part of a pattern of improper conduct, or was so hostile to
22 Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U:S. 17, 51 (1954).
23 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
24 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1950).
25 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942)
(concurring opinion). .4ccord: Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490 (1949) and Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460 (1950).
2 0 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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unions that it impaired freedom of choice." -In studying the NLRB's
handling of the "captive audience" problem, these decisions are not
significant, for the Board put little stress on how, when, and where
the speech was delivered.
It was not until 1942, after the Supreme Court expressly disapproved
the tenet that employers may not express themselves vigorously on the
pros and cons of unionism,2" that the Board found that employer speech
tended to produce a coercive effect primarily because it was made to
employees assembled during working hours.2 9 The Board's rationale in
American Tube Bending was that words take their meaning "from the
setting in which they are used, of which the relation between the speaker
and the hearer is perhaps the most important part"; 3" that vigorous but
non-threatening expressions of anti-unionism become coercive under a
"totality of conduct" doctrine when they are made to an assembly of
employees during working hours. The doctrine expressed in this case
was short-lived, for the Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
order.31
The seeds for a different approach to the "captive audience" prob-
lem were planted in 1945 by the Board's decision in Thompson Products,
Inc., a case involving a petition to set aside an election on the ground
that employer speech to a "captive audience" substantially disturbed the
ability of the employee-voters to make the kind of free choice contemplated
by the statute. The Board held that anti-union speeches delivered to
workers assembled during working hours were a sufficient basis for in-
validating an election. The rationale was that this avenue of communica-
tion brought to bear on the employees the weight of economic power in a
manner not available to the union, rendering them "unduly responsive
to the slightest suggestions," thus making the "adjurations of the speakers"
coercive, and impairing freedom of choice. Since the decision stressed
that otherwise proper speech tended to coerce because of where and when
it was uttered, it might be viewed as an application of the American
Tube Bending doctrine. However, the emphasis of the opinion on the
act of compelling the employees to attend the meeting suggested that
perhaps such conduct was an independent ground for restraint.
This suggestion was confirmed the following year by the decision in
27 Harrisburg Children's Dress Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1937); Indianapolis
Glove Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 231 (1938); Triplett Electrical Instrument Co., 5 N.L.R.B.
835 (1938); Nebel Knitting Co., Inc., 6 N.L.R.B. 284 (1938). For a later "captive
audience" case grounded on the same theory, see Yan Raalte, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B.
1326 (1946). (Speech contained a "covet threat," a "plain intimation of reprisal,"
and was an integral part of a pattern of coercive conduct.)
28 NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
2 9 American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942).
80 NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
3 1 NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. 2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943).
32 60 N.L.R.B. 1381, 1385, 1386 (1945).
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the Clark Brothers Co. case. 3 In this decision the Board placed stress on
how, when, and where the speech was delivered. The case held that the
act of compelling employees to listen to an anti-union speech during
working hours, irrespective of the words used or the ideas conveyed, was
itself coercive. The Board felt that the employer's conduct produced
this effect because it was a particularly telling exercise of economic force,
not unlike the show of physical force involved when one person holds
another while he tells him something; and that the employer had also
intruded on the employees' right to be free to determine whether or not
to receive aid, advice, and information concerning self-organization.
A possible explanation for the doctrinal change evident in the
Clark Brothers decision is that the Board felt that the dnerican Tube
Bending doctrine, which stressed the effect of the method by which a
speech is made on its contents, would receive no better treatment from
other courts than from the Second Circuit3 4 and that the approach of
Clark Brothers, with its emphasis on the coercive effect of the act of
compulsion, would be more apt to succeed.
However, if this was the Board's expectation, it must have been dis-
appointed. Reviewing the decision in the Clark Brothers case, the Second
Circuit accepted the proposition that section 7 of the NLRA guarantees
employees the right to be free to determine whether or not to receive aid,
and information concerning self-organization, but it rejected the view
that compelling employees to assemble and listen to anti-union speeches
is an invasion of that right per se. The court enforced the Board's order
in the case in part on the ground that the employer's conduct in address-
ing the employees on company time is improper if he does not provide
a similar or "equal opportunity" to the union.3s
Three months later (October 27, 1947) the NLRB appeared
to turn away from its approach in the Clark Brothers case and to adopt
the Second Circuit's position. The Board dismissed a complaint based
on an employer's speech to an assembly of employees during working
hours on the ground that there was no evidence that a like opportunity
to speak to the employees had been unavailable to the union. 6 The
Board did not pass on the question of whether section 8(c) of the Taft-
Hartley amendments compelled this result.
In April of the next year the Board, while denying that it was
relying on the Clark Brothers doctrine, granted a petition to set aside
33 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946), Reilly dissenting.
34 8ee NLRB v. Montgomery Ward Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946),
denying enforcement of 64 N.L.R.B. 4392 (1945) on the ground that the conditions
under which a listener receives a message do not make it coercive.
35 NLRB v. Clark Brothers Co., 163 F. 2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). The
employer had also committed a number of other unfair labor practices, a circum-
stance which also supported the Board's order on a "totality of conduct" theory.
Cf. NLRB v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 152 F. 2d 400 (2d Cir. 1945).
36 Merry Brothers Brick & Tile Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 136 (Oct. 27, 1947).
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an election in the General Shoe Corp. case." The decision was grounded
in part on the fact that the president of the employer, not content to talk
to a large assemblage of employees, had called twenty to twenty-five
employees into his office, the "locus of final authority in the plant," to
listen to intemperate anti-union statements during working hours. The
opinion stated that the privilege of section 8(c) operates in unfair labor
practice cases, not in election cases, and suggested, if it did not hold, that
the Clark Brothers doctrine would no longer be applied in the former.
Any doubt that the Clark Brothers doctrine had lost its vitality
ended a month later when the Board, after examining the language and
the legislative history of section 8(c), abandoned it for all purposes. 38
The General Shoe case was distinguished in election cases on the ground
that there the employer's conduct had "so far abused normal campaign
tactics that the employees were inhibited in their free choice of a bargain-
ing representative." 9 In May of 1950 the Board went a step further,
holding that an employer's speech to his employees assembled during work-
ing hours did not justify invalidating the election even though there was
evidence that the employer had ignored the union's request for a
like opportunity to address employees.4"
Thus, by 1950 it not only appeared that the Clark Brothers doctrine
had been set to rest for all purposes, but it also seemed that the "equal
opportunity" approach suggested by the Second Circuit in its enforcing
opinion had died aborning.
However, after 15 years of experience and two doctrinal failures
the Board still believed that "captive audiences" should be regulated. Ap-
parently the search was for s6me ground which would survive the
scrutiny of the circuit courts and conform with congressional intention
as manifested in section 8 (c). Neither American Tube Bending nor
Clark Brothers appeared to satisfy these requirements, but the "equal
opportunity" doctrine suggested by the Second Circuit was promising.
In any event, for whatever reason, the Board in 1951 took the position
in Bonwit Teller, Inc. that the employer who delivers a speech to an
audience of his employees assembled on company property and time and
denies the union's request for a similar opportunity to address the em-
ployees thereby violates section 8(a) (1)41. Bonwit Teller was not simply
a revival of the Board's earlier doctrine in the Clark Brothers case; it
was a different approach, grounded on a different analysis.4" The decision
was rationalized on two separate but related grounds.
37 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (April 16, 1948).
38 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (May 13, 1948).
39 Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 78 N.LR.B. 488 (July 22, 1948).
40 S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (May 16, 1950).
41 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), Reynolds dissenting.
42The Board adhered to Babcox & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948), which
had overruled Clark Brothers. However, it overruled S & S Corrugated Paper
Machinery Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950), supra, footnote 40, which was incon-
sistent in principle with Bonwit Teller.
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First, the Board stated that while generally an employer may not
prohibit the solicitation of union memberships on company property dur-
ing non-working time, a retail store has a special privilege to bar such
solicitation on its selling floors at any time.43 This privilege fixes on
the employer an obligation to enforce the rule with an even hand, i.e.,
to apply it without discrimination.44 An employer who bars pro-union
electioneering on his premises while at the same time utilizing them
himself for anti-union electioneering violates this duty.
Second, the Board held that section 7 guarantees employees the right
to a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides of the story under cir-
cumstances which are approximately equal. This right is abridged where
the employer makes a speech on company time and property and refuses
the union's request to do likewise, if the circumstances are such that the
employees' right can be preserved only by granting the request. Such
circumstances exist when the union has no access to company property
and the employer speech is delivered so close to the time of the election
that the union has insufficient time to offset it by compaigning with other
methods.
The Board soon extended the principle spelled out in the second
part of its Bonwit Teller opinion. In a number of cases involving unfair
labor practices or election challenges the Board held that an employer
who makes an anti-union speech to an assemblage of his employees on
company property during working time has a duty to g-ant the union an
equal opportunity, even though there is no rule banning solicitation on
company property during non-working time. In short, the Board's
view was that nothing short of an opportunity for the union to reply
under substantially similar circumstances is enough to preserve the em-
ployees' right to hear both sides of the story. This was the "broad"
Bonwit Teller doctrine, based on the principle that conditions of free
43 May Dept. Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944); Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77
N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948). J. L. Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946).
44 Cf. Hershey Metal Products Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 695 (1948).
4GBiltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.LR.B. 905 (1951) (Election set aside because
employer's speech was made shortly before polls opened and union adherent's
request was denied, although there was no rule prohibiting solicitation, Reynolds
dissenting.) Accord: Bennardin Bottle Cap Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1952) ; Belknap
Hardware & Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B., 484 (1952); Foreman & Ciark, Inc., 101
N.L.R.B. 40 (1952) (Herzog dissenting because speech made two days before
election and union made no request); National Screw & Mfg. Co., 101 N.L.R.B.
1360 (1952) (Herzog dissenting because union reply speech via sound truck
reached employees assembled in plant's eating area during lunch period) ; Metro-
politari Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953) (speech two days before election
followed by denial of union's request violated section 8(a) (1) because employer's
conduct invaded the employees' "right to hear both sides of the story under cir-
cumstances which reasonably approximate equality." Herzog dissenting because
the employer had no rule prohibiting solication) ; Accord: Onondaga Pottery Co.,
103 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953); Seamprufe, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 298 (1953).
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choice are preserved if, and only if, the employer dosage is followed
by an opportunity for an equally strong union antidote.
Equality of opportunity is an appealing basis for doctrine. How-
ever, as applied in a "captive audience" situation it runs afoul of other
notions.. While an employer's property rights may be subordinated to the
extent necessary to permit his employees effectively to exercise the right
of self-organization by, for example, requiring him to permit union
solicitation on company property during non-working time, 46 it seems
anomalous to require him to subsidize the speeches of the union whom
he sees as an economic adversary.
In large part for this reason the Bonwit-Teller doctrine was not
warmly received by the courts of appeal.4" The Second Circuit accepted
the narrow holding of the Bonwit Teller case itself, basing its decision
on the employer's discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule.
Rejecting the Board's broad order directing the company to stop making
speeches on company property without granting a similar opportunity
to the union, the court gave the employer a choice. He could either
take advantage of his special privilege as a retail store to bar union
organizers from the selling floors at any time and desist from making
such speeches without granting the union's request. Or he could give
up the privilege, thereby opening up his premises to union solicitation
during non-working hours, make such speeches, and refuse the union's
request. While the employer's property rights are to some extent sub-
ordinated under either alternative, the latter choice does not involve any
direct cash outlay for pro-union activities.
Under the Second Circuit's view the employer's offense is his dis-
criminatory application of a no-solicitation rule. It should not be sup-
posed, however, that all such discrimination offends the statute. Apparently
an employer may -bar union solicitation during working time while paying
his employees to hear his views on unionism.48 In short, the Second
Circuit's view is that union access to company premises during non-work-
ing hours is a sufficient antidote to the employer's "captive audience"
speeches.
Despite the views of the Second Circuit, the Board continued to
apply the "broad" Bonwit Teller doctrine until December of 1953 when
it decided the Livingston Shirt case,4" holding that the employer's refusal
46 Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Cf. NLRB v. Water-
man Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336
U.S. 226 (1949) ; and NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (6th
Cir. 1948).
47NLRB v. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 197 F. 2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), enforcing
96 N.L.R.B. 608, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953), NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
214 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954-), refusing to enforce 102 N.L.R.B. 581. But see Fore-
man & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954).
48 See NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F. 2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953),
enforcing 102 N.L.R.B. No. 68.
49 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953), (Murdock dissenting).
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of the union's request did not violate section 8 (a) (1) although there was
a rule prohibiting activity for or against any union on company property
during working time. While Livwngston Shirt is consistent with the actual
Board holding in the Bonweit Teller case, it is plainly a rejection of the
"broad" doctrine and represerits the Board's fourth try in eleven years
to deal with the "captive audience" situation. The Board now agrees with
the Second Circuit that the employees' right to hear both sides of the
story is preserved if the union has access to company premises during
non-working time.
The Board has continued to adhere to Livingston Shirt,"0 but its
success in the circuit courts is by no means assured, particularly where
the no-solicitation rule which runs to non-working time is valid because
a retail store is involved. If the rule is lawful, the speech non-coercive,
and the act of compulsion proper, why should the employer be obligated
to give the union a helping hand? If the no-solicitation rule does not
unreasonably abridge the employees' opportunity to exercise the rights
of section 7, why should a lawful speech made by lawful methods obligate
the employer to change the rule? 5 1
The difficulty seems to stem primarily from the Board's failure
to recognize that underlying both Bonwit Teller and Livingston Shirt
is the basic notion of the discarded Clark Brothers doctrine-viz., that
an employer's act of compelling his employees to attend a meeting on
company time and property is an exercise of economic power which has
an impact on freedom of choice separate and apart from anything the
employer says. Like the union that sets up a picket line, the employer who
calls his employees into a company meeting room or into his office
establishes a "locus in quo" which has more potential for inducing action
or non-action than the message he conveys." Whether this impact vio-
lates section 8(a)(1) is a question which "involves pre-eminently an
exercise of judgment on matters peculiarly within . . . [the Board's]
50 See Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 220 (1954), Beeson
dissenting.
5ISee NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954), denying
enforcement of 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953). By rejecting the proposition that the em-
ployer's speech plus refusal to grant the union's request was a discriminatory appli-
cation of the retail store's no-solicitation rule, the court threw doubt on the validity
of the Livingston Shirt case. But see Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B.
No. 220 (1954), applying Livingston Shirt and distinguishing the Woolworth case
on the ground that the no-solication rule was unlawful. (Beeson dissenting). See
also Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954), upholding the
Board's decision setting aside an election on the ground that both the Bonwit
Teller and Peerless Plywood doctrines, 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), infra, footnote
54, are within the Board's "wide ... discretion in establishing the procedures
and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining repre-
sentatives by employees."
52 Compare, Bldg. Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950).
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special competence." 5 Apparently the Board's present answer to the
question is that it does not.
It is noteworthy, however, that the Board's current doctrine in
election cases recognizes that such speeches produce an impairment of
freedom of choice so substantial that they cannot -he tolerated if they are
made within the twenty-four hours immediately preceding the opening of
the polls.54 It is also noteworthy that the Board apparently still follows a
Clark Brothers type of analysis in election cases where an employer de-
livers an anti-union speech to groups of ten or twelve employees called
into his office during working hours.55
53Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 57 (1954) (concurring
opinion); Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
54 Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), holding that an employer's
speech to his employees involuntarily assembled on company property and working
time during the 24-hour period immediately prior to the opening of the polls
justifies invalidating the election, regardless of what he said or how generous
he was in permitting the union access to his property. (Murdock dissenting in part).
The rationale of the rule is that such speeches becloud the employees' judgment
and interfere with the thoughtful weighing of the issues involved. They have an
"unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend to interfere with that sober and
thoughtful choice which a free election is designed to reflect."
This rule is applicable even though the employer granted the union's
request to make a speech under similar circumstances. Cross Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
1267 (1954), (Murdock dissenting). Accord: Hamilton Watch Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
1608 (1954), (Murdock dissenting). But if the union wins the election, the employer
cannot urge his misconduct in making a speech and permitting the union to do
likewise as a ground for setting aside the results. Camp Milling Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
No. 73 (1954), (Rodgers dissenting).
A violation of Livingston Shirt will cause the Board to set aside an election,
Detergents, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1954), but a violation of Peerless Plywood
is not an unfair labor practice, Sparkletts Drinking Water Corp., 107 N.L.R.B.
1462 (1954). Thus, the Board has adopted a double standard in "captive audience"
situations arising during the 24-hour period before the polls open. However, the
Board apparently follows a single standard in other situations involving employer
speech. See American Laundry Machinery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953); compare
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950) with National Furniture Mfg.
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953) and Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1954),
which apparently abandon the double standard of General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B.
124 (1948), supra, footnote 37. It follows that the Board believes that "captive
audience" speech is more than the dissemination of ideas and information.
55 General Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951) (Such conduct by an employer
is coercive because his statements are uttered in the locus of final authority).
Compare General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), cited in footnote 37, supra.
See George J. Meyer Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 154 (1955) (Citing General Shoe
Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499, with approval in holding that interviews with each em-
ployee in employer's office constituted ground for setting aside an election). See also
Coolidge Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1954) (Not ground for setting aside election
where group meetings held in office outside working hours and attendance not
compulsory). Compare The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 N.L.R.B. No.
106 (1955) (Peerless ,Plywood doctrine applied and election set aside where




Future developments remain to be seen. However, one cannot
help but suspect that the last word on "captive audiences" has not been
written.
II. INTERROGATION
Employers often want to know, for good or bad reasons or just out
of idle curiosity, whether their employees are or have been union members,
what their attitudes are towards unions, or what their reasons are for
wanting unions. The NLRB has held since its inception that an em-
ployer's interrogation of his employees with respect to activities protected
by section 7 may interfere with, restrain, or coerce them in the exercise
of their rights to engage in such activities. An employer's questioning
of his employees about their union activities manifests his interest, con-
cern, or even apprehension about such activities, which may be interpreted
by an employee, reasonably or unreasonably, as indicating displeasure,
opposition, or even an intention to take discriminatory action against
those engaged in such activities. One consequence may be that the em-
ployees will be intimidated into not engaging in such activities. Moreover,
an employer's questioning often will force the employee to express a view
against the union, which he may be embarrassed to reverse later.
Although interrogation involves speech, it is not primarily a means
of expressing an opinion; it is rather a process of gathering information.
Accordingly, the policy reasons for permitting an employer to freely
state his views, arguments, and opinions do not apply to interrogation, and
the Board does not apply section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley amendments
to interrogation."s
In determining whether an employer's questioning of employees
on their protected activities is an unfair labor practice, the test is necessarily
the factual one under language of section 8 (a) (1) whether the question-
ing interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in section 7 of the Act. The situations that arise
are extremely varied."7 There has never been any doubt under Board
decisions that questioning may be coercive; the only issue has been
whether all questioning is coercive per se, or whether a line may be drawn,
and, if so, where.
At first the Board proceeded on a case by case basis and held various
instances of interrogation to be unfair labor practices. However, gradually
the rule evolved that any systematc interrogation of employees about
their protected activitie§ was per se an unfair labor practice. This became
known as the tandard-Coosa-Thatcher doctrine."8 The Board based
this doctrine upon two grounds: (1) "Inherent in the very nature of the
rights protected by section 7 is the . . . right of privacy in their en-
joyment," and employer interrogation is an intrusion into this exclusive
56Ames Spot Welder Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 352, 355 (1947).
07 For a resume of some of the situations involving interrogation, see 15
N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 93-6 (1950); and 16 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 144-6 (1951).
5885 N.LR.B. 1358 (1949).
1955]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
employee domain which interferes with this right; (2) Interrogation
about union activities, like open surveillance of union meetings, always
tends to restrain or coerce.
The Board applied this rule even where the employer's purpose
in interrogating the employees was to determine whether the union
represented a majority so that he could know whether he was compelled
to bargain with it or to determine whether unionization was imminent in
order to decide how much wages he would have to pay so he could
determine how much to bid on a government contract.5 9
The Board gradually extended the doctrine to its extreme, and by
the 195 0 's it took the position that almost all interrogation was per se
an unfair labor practice, notwithstanding that the inquiries were isolated
or innocuous.60 However, either because the courts would not accept
such an extreme doctrine or because the Board itself felt that the doctrine
should be reasonably limited, it refused to base an unfair labor practice
on extremely isolated, casual and in-consequential questioning.6'
In July 1954, after the change in national administration in Wash-
ington in 1952 and after the Republican appointees became a majority on
the Board, there was a noticeable shift in the Board's attitude on interroga-
tion. In the Blue Flash Express case 2 the Board ruled that an employer did
not commit an unfair labor practice where he systematically questioned
all the employees in the office individually to determine whether a
union had majority status in order to answer the union's request to bar-
gain. Bbth the majority and the dissenting members agreed that this
decision represented a shift in Board policy. Indeed, the Board expressly
overruled the Standard-Coosa-Thatcher doctrine, and held that the test
is whether, under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably
tends to restrain or interfere with employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the act.
No reasonable man would deny that this change was a result
of a change in Board personnel brought about by a change in national
administration. The fact that the new members were in the majority
whereas the old members dissented, the fact that the change came so
quickly after the change in Board personnel, and the fact that the change
was not caused by any very recent appellate decision, makes this seem
59 C. Pappas Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 765 (1949); Russell Kingston, 74 N.L.R.B. 484
(1947), petition for enforcement denied, 172 F. 2d 771 (6th Cir. 1949). An exception
was made, however, where the questioning was necessary to enable the employer
to defend against an unfair labor practice charge. See discussion in Joy Silk Mills,
85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
60 16 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 146 (1951); 17 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 112 (1952).
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 640 (1951).
61U. S. Gypsum Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 966, 968 (1951); Wilson & Company, 95
N.L.R.B. 882 (1951), (Herzog dissenting); Stafford Operating Company, 96
N.L.R.B. 1217, 1221 (1951); Beaver Machine & Tool Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 33 (1951);
Boston & Lockport Block Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 686, 692 (1952).
02 109 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1954).
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certain. However, the motivations of the new personnel in making this
change are by no means so dear. Critics of the new Board have intimated
that the change must have been motivated by a pro-employer bias. Board
Chairman Farmer on the other hand has contended that this decision
was required by decisions in several circuit courts, and that the Board was
obliged to conform to those decisions.63 The only way of resolving this
dispute is to examine the difference between the majority and minority
opinions and then examine the decisions of the court of appeals to see
whether such decisions require acceptance of the majority view or the
dissenting view.
A. The difference between the majority and the dissent.
The majority and the dissent agree that the test is whether the
interrogation, reasonably interpreted, tends to impair the free exercise by
employees of their rights under the Act, and that in applying this test the
Board may carefully weigh and evaluate all the evidence. Since the
dissenters agree with this formulation of the test, apparently they join
the majority in rejecting the right of privacy rationale upon which the
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher doctrine rested in part. However, their opinion
is ambiguous on this point. Both majority and dissent agree that isolated,
casual and very inconsequential questioning is not a violation. The ma-
jority holds that a systematic interrogation of employees on their union
status in order to determine whether a union represents a majority of
employees may not be an unfair labor practice where there are no cir-
cumstances or history indicating that the questioning has a coercive effect.
They also hold that motive is one of the material circumstances in making
this determination. The position of the dissenters appears to be that any
such systematic interrogation is per se an unfair labor practice, regardless
of the employer's motive. The dissenters also emphasize that an employer
may find out by other means whether a union represents a majority.
B. The authorities.
The majority and the dissent agree that the test is whether the
employees on their union status is not per se an unfair labor prac-
tice is supported by the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Atlas Life Insur-
ance Co. v. N.L.R.B. 64 where an employer orally asked his employees
whether they were union members in order to discover the union's status,
and by the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Wayside Press, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B. 65 where an employer's employment application blank asked
whether the applicant belonged to a union. Both of these decisions are in-
consistent with the position of the dissent in the Blue Flash case. The
majority's opinion is also supported by the language of several other
recent decisions to the effect that whether questioning is unlawful is an
63 Speech before the Cleveland Bar Association, March 16, 1955, reported
at 35 L.R.R. 407.
14 195 F. 2d 136 (10th Cir. 1952).
05206 F. 2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953).
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issue of fact; but these other decisions did not involve systematic interroga-
tion and could have been distinguished on this ground.6" Although the
courts of appeal in many cases had sustained the Board in basing an unfair
labor practice charge on interrogation, the dissenters could not cite
appellate authority for the proposition that all systematic interrogation is
per se an unfair labor practice.
In summary, there was adequate judicial support for the Board's
decision in the Blue Flash case. However, since the precise issue was not
settled in many circuits, the Board was not compelled to reverse its pre-
vious position without arguing the issue in other circuits and attempting
to obtain Supreme Court review. The Board no doubt changed its position
and the shift was immediately caused by a change in Board personnel,
but in view of the state of the law in the courts of appeal, abandonment
of the Standard-Coosa-Thatcher doctrine was not surprising. However,
the essentials of the new doctrine are not entirely clear.
The Board's rejection of the view that interrogation per se interferes
with the emplvyees' right of privacy as spelled out in the Standard-Coosa-
Thatcher case is a change of considerable significance. However, per-
haps a more significant aspect of the decision is the holding that motive
is a material factor in determining whether interrogation violates the
act. Unfortunately the majority opinion does not specify exactly what
role motive- plays in resolving this issue.
The facts of the Blue Flash case show that the employer wanted
to ascertain the union's strength in order to decide how to respond to
its demand for recognition. Although he revealed this motive to the
questioned employees, some of them were so apprehensive that they did
not answer truthfully. The Board majority did not regard this evi-
dence as controlling, apparently because they thought that the employees'
reaction under the circumstances was unreasonable. This part of the opinion
suggests that systematic interrogation does not produce an illegal effect
unless the General Counsel proves that the questioning instilled feAr in
the employees and that their reaction was reasonable. However, this is
a doubtful interpretation. The subjective reactions of particular employees
to their employer's conduct have not generally been decisive in section
8 (a) (1) cases. It seems more likely that the position of the Board majority
simply is that the fact that some employees were apprehensive about the
interrogation is no more important than the fact that some others were
not. Moreover, whether interrogation is an unfair labor practice should
not turn on whether .the questioned employees were truthful in their
66 Sax v. NLRB, 171 F. 2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Winer, 194 F.
2d 370 (7th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. England Bros., 201 F. 2d 395 (1st Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Tennessee Coach, 191 F. 2d 546 (6th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward, 192 F. 2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 209 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co.,
212 F. 2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1954).
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answers, for if it did an employer could never tell in advance whether his
conduct was permissible.
If this anaylsis is sound, the controlling test is the vague one of
reasonableness. Except the cases where the interrogation is set in a
context of unfair labor practices (and perhaps even there, since it may
be inferred from such a context that the purpose of the interrogation was
to interfere with the exercise of employee rights), the fact that emerges
as decisive in determining whether, "under all of the circumstances," the
interrogation "reasonably tends" to restrain or interfere with employees
in the exercise of their section 7 rights is the employer's motive, established
by his statements, his conduct before, during, and after the interrogation,
and the use he made of the information gleaned. What motives justify
interrogation, whether proof of a bad motive is part of the General
Counsel's case or proof of a good motive is part of the employer's defense,
or whether the employer, assuming that he has a proper motive, must
reveal it at the time of the interrogation, are matters for speculation.
The Board's position may be that systematic interrogation impairs the
free exercise of the rights of section 7 but is privileged where it is under-
taken for a business purpose which the Board recognizes as proper. Un-
der this view the Board's judgment in respect to the usual effect of
systematic interrogation remains unchanged but a limited area of employer
privilege is recognized. If this is the correct interpretation of the Blue
Flash decision, it had support in the opinions of the courts of appeals.
67
On the other hand, Blue Flash may be read to mean that systematic
interrogation does not tend to restrain or coerce unless the employer
undertook it for that purpose. Under this view interrogation cases will be
disposed of by applying the test which is used in situations where an em-
ployer increases wages shortly before an election. The Board's position
in these cases is that the employer's conduct interferes with the em-
ployees' free exercise of the rights of section 7 and violates section
8(a) (1) where the conduct, its timing, and other circumstances establish
that he intended such interference.6" If this is what the Blue Flash
decision means, it represents a major change in Board policy because it
recognizes that an employer has as legitimate an interest in discovering his
employees' attitudes about trade unionism as he has in running his busi-
ness affairs. Under this interpretation, systematic interrogation is not a
violation unless the General Counsel proves that the employer wanted the
information for the purpose of defeating the union. 6 8a
6 See NLRB v. Kingston, 172 F. 2d 771 (6th Cir. 1949).
08 Hudson Hosiery Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1947). Cf. Radio Officer's Union
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), discussing the requirements for proof of motive
and effect in discrimination cases under section 8(a) (3).
68a This position is supported, at least inferentially, by the court's opinion in
Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F. 2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953) (Interrogation not
unlawful unless evidence of a background of union hostility or of attempts to use
information so garnered to restrain or coerce).
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III. SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE
The Board has continually held that an employer violates section
8(a) (1) where he engages in espionage or surveillance of union activi-
ties, or intentionally creates the appearance of surveillance. Such
espionage or surveillance tends to cause employees who engage in union
activities to be apprehensive of their job security and thus to restrain and
interfere with organizational activity. Indeed espionage and surveillance
were among the evils to which the original Wagner Act was directed, and
a substantial proportion of the cases in the Board's early years involved
charges of espionage and surveillance. The Board has been so consistent
in holding that espionage and surveillance constitute unfair labor practices
that the number of cases raising the issue is much fewer now than
formerly, and the items of surveillance involved in these cases are often
inconsequential or isolated. Although there have been slight changes in
the Board's policy in minor borderline situations,69 the main rules have
continued unchanged. Indeed, the great majority of the current charges of
unlawful interrogation or surveillance are decided pretty much as they
always have been. The violations now presented to the Board appear less
flagrant than those of the 1930's, but they continue to exist and they con-
tinue to form the basis of unfair labor practice findings. 70
It is arguable, however, that the decision in Blue Flash will have
some influence on the disposition of these cases. Surveillance and
espionage, like interrogation, are methods for gathering information.
Successfully concealed surveillance or espionage can hardly be said to
restrain or coerce. Decisions holding that such conduct violates section
8(a) (1) rest upon the notion that this type of employer intrusion into
the field of union activity which the act exclusively reserves to his em-
ployees is an "interfering with" under section 8(a)(1) and hence an
unfair labor practice. 71 Having apparently rejected this rationale in the
Blue Flash case, the Board may re-examine the cases involving successfully
concealed surveillance and espionage.
When surveillance is known to the employees it is like interrogation
Such surveillance tends to restrain or coerce, even though some of the
69 For example in the situation where an employer instructs a supervisor to
engage in surveillance and the instruction is never carried out, see the following
sequence of decisions: J. A. Booker, 78 N.L.R.B. 553, 554 (1948) (not unfair labor
practice) ; H. N. Thayer Company, 99 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1125 (1952) (statement that
such an instruction is itself unfair labor practice); Florida Builders, Inc., 111
N.L.R.B. No. 130 (1955) (not unfair labor practice).
70Nashua Mfg. Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (1954); Lewis Coal Co., 108
N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1954); Hunt Heater Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 200 (1954); Hud-
son Hosiery Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 197 (1954) ; Wells Dairies Cooperative, 110
N.LR.B. No. 142 (1954); News Printing Co., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 209 (1954); Idaho
Egg Producers, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1955) ; Cornell-Dubilier Electric Corp., 111
N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1955).
71 Montgomery Ward & Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 191 (1940); H. N. Thayer Co.,
99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952).
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employees who were its victims continued their union activities.72 It is
conceivable that the Board might apply its Blue Flash doctrine to cases
involving open surveillance. If it does so, a major change in Board policy
will be worked. Thus far, however, there is no evidence that the Board
is applying the Blue Flash doctrine to such cases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
While the NLRB has made many significant doctrinal changes
during its 20-year life, the number of such changes is no greater than
might be expected from an administrative agency working on a legal
frontier under a staute that generally grants it a wide discretion in fashion-
ing policy. Indeed, if one subtracts the policy changes which apparently
have been reactions either to Congress or the courts, a rather stable
pattern is revealed. So far as major changes in doctrine governing the
issues we have examined are concerned, only the adoption of the Bonwit
Tell7' doctrine and its subsequent replacement by the Lhvngston Shirt
doctrine cannot be satisfactorily explained as Board responses to the com-
pulsions of either statutory language or judicial opinions.
It is arguable that the abandonment of the 4merican Tube Bend-
ing doctrine, in "captive audience" cases, the overruling of the decision
in the Clark Brothers case, and the adoption of the Blue Flash doctrine
should be added to this list. However, the argument is not entirely con-
vincing.
It is true that the Board might have persisted in following the
American Tube Bending doctrine even after the Second Circuit's refusal
to enforce. However, that court's position was so plainly supported by
the Supreme Court's decision in the Virginia Electric & Power case
that the Board's choice seemingly was based on an accurate appraisal
of the limits of its powers.7" It is also true that the language of section
8(c) did not literally require overruling of the Clark Brothers doctrine,
which did not regulate either the expression or dissemination of opinions
as such but regulated a particular method of utterance. Indeed, section
8(c) has been held not to protect from regulation particular methods
for uttering union speech, i.e., peaceful picketing.a' However, the legis-
lative history of that section of the Taft-Hartley amendments was suf-
ficiently clear to make it likely that Board persistence in following the
doctrine would have been interpreted by Congress as an act of defiance.
It is also possible that adoption of the Blue Flash doctrine in interroga-
tion cases may represent a change of policy that goes beyond anything
7 2 Montgomery Ward & Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 191 (1940) (It is immaterial that
the prescribed conduct does not produce the desired result) ; Cf. Somerset Classics,
Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 1676 (1950).
73 See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946),
denying enforcement of 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945).
73a IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
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required by the courts of appeals. But until the full meaning of the Blue
Flash case is revealed by subequent decisions, this is suspicion rather than
fact.
Even where Board changes cannot be satisfoctorily explained either
by. the Taft-Hartley amendments or the opinions of the courts of appeal,
there is little convincing evidence that they were caused by shifts of
the political winds. The substitution of the Lvingston Shirt doctrine
for the Bonwit Teller doctrine was rather plainly related to changes
in Board personnel, 'but it is certainly not clear that this shift in policy
was motivated by a desire to favor management over labor. Indeed, the
chairman of the predecessor Board had from time to time manifested his
disapproval of the "broad" Bonwit Teller doctrine for reasons which
conform substantially to those underlying the decision in the Livingston
Shirt case.7
4
Adoption of the Blue Flash doctrine may possibly be more disturbing.
If it reflects a Board tolerance for all kinds of interrogation and sur-
veillance except where an intention to interfere with the exercise of
section 7 rights is proved, Blue Flash may fairly be said to reflect either
a pro-management bias or an astonishing ignorance of the facts of in-
dustrial life. But it is by no means clear that the Blue Flash decision is
intended to have such far-reaching implications.
In general, at least so far as the issues we have examined are con-
cerned, the NLRB, while it has often been the subject of political
pressures, seems to have resisted them well-better, perhaps, than one
might have supposed a priori. The drift of doctrine has been in the
general direction of greater tolerance for various forms of employer
conduct. However, this trend, even where it has been given impetus
by changes in Board personnel, e.g., the decision in the Blue Flash case,
is explicable on grounds other than the paying off of political debts.
74 See footnote 45, supra.
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